



LONG Recommendation

Current Share Price: £2.62

Target Share Price: £5.64

Upside: 115.8%

Date: 15 June 2025

By: Gustav Wisenius, Gustav Bartholdsson & Oscar Isacsson



Table of Contents

- 1 Executive Summary
- 2 Business Overview
- Market/Industry Overview
- Thesis 1.1 Growth Strategy
- 5 Thesis 1.2 Why continued Store Expansion
- Thesis 2.1 Valuation Disconnected From Reality
- 7 Thesis 2.2 Catalysts for Multiple Re-Rating
- 8 Valuation & Scenario Analysis
- 9 Risks & Mitigation
 - 10 Management




LUND UNIVERSITY FINANCE SOCIETY EST 1991

Executive Summary

Undervalued Discounter set for 80% Upside as Sector Exits Create Growth Runway





The market overlooks what truly drives the Company's growth

- Post pandemic Like-for-like growth became the main KPI for investors, however what really drives topline apart from 2021 is store expansion.
- Garden centers are expected to act as a buffer for gross margins, mitigating inflationary pressures on the FMCG segment.

With capital exiting the sector, consolidation opportunities are emerging

- Post-pandemic, discount retailers have struggled financially, leaving room for stronger players
- B&M can capitalize on competitors' mass closures, as seen historically, as competitors exit, financially strong players like B&M has the opportunity to consolidate

Defensible gross margins supported by expansion in France and a reset in leadership

- Higher gross margins compared to UK due to lower competition.
- Lower market penetration in the discount sector, in a market similar to the UK
- New CEO can start rebuilding trust in the Company again after Alex Russo's departure

Key Facts


- B&M or ("the Company"), founded in 1978, has grown to become one of the leading discount retailers in the UK, operating 774 stores domestically, 133 in France and 338 convenience-focused low-price grocery stores.
- B&M's unique business model and revenue split enable the Company to maintain the lowest prices on the market whilst retaining the highest margins among industry peers.
- Aggressive expansion plan ahead backed by strong unit economics and market leading position in DIY.
 Forecasted to open net 135 new stores in the UK and 51 in France through 2027E.

Financials		Insider Ownership/ Main Shareholders		
Share Price:	£2.62	Founding family Ownership		
MCAP:	£2,630 M	Aurora Family	7.3%	
EV (EX leasing):	£3,767 M	Main Shareholders		
LTM EV/EBITDA:	6.1x	 Capital Research & Management Co. 	9.1%	
•	0.17	GIC Pte Ltd.	4.9%	
LTM EV/EBIT:	6.9x	 Orbis Investment Management Ltd. 	4.9%	
Net Deht/FRITDA:	1 3x	ŭ		

Why Does the Opportunity Exist?

■ The market overestimates the importance of like-for-like (LFL) growth, assuming a strong link between LFL performance and valuation. However, the correlation between LFL growth and overall business performance is weaker than commonly believed. B&M has increased its market share by 26% since 2017, yet the Company's multiple has compressed by approximately 65%, despite solid fundamentals.

 Weak UK economy and bearish sentiment amongst retail, scares investors. Although B&M thrives in economic downturns, as bad times fuels the Companys acquisition strategy.



Sources: The Company, Analyst Estimates

2

3

Business

Market

Valua

Risks

Management




Business Overview

B&M: Lucerative Business Model, Enables Lower Prices on FMCG

Cin

Company Overview

- B&M is a UK-based discount retailer operating a unique mix of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) and general merchandise (GM) as well as garden centers. Founded in 1978, the company has grown rapidly and currently operates 774 stores in the UK and 133 stores in France. 10% of revenue is generated from the subsidiary Heron Foods, which operates small food-focused stores.
- The company relies on Hybrid Sourcing or opportunistic sourcing, where the Company sources a majority of the products through third-party dealers allowing B&M to secure one-off branded product deals at 20 –30% discounts compared to direct supplier prices.



Stores Overview

 Reporting Segment
 Stores
 Sales
 EBIT

 B&M UK
 774
 4,472 £M
 521 £M

 B&M France
 133
 558 £M
 55 £M

 Heron Foods
 348
 569 £M
 22 £M

Net New Stores/year last 6 years

- B&M UK: 25.66
- B&M France: 6.2
- Heron Foods: 10.8



Revenue/Store CAGR last 6 years

- B&M UK: 3.9%
- B&M France: 21.4%
- Heron Foods: 4.6%



EBIT/Store CAGR last 6 years

- B&M UK: 5.2%
- B&M France: 55.6%
- Heron Foods: 8.7%



Gear Cola

Valuation



Summary Financial Metrics Revenue Last 12 months: £ 5,600 M Last 6-year CAGR: 9.4% Gross Margin Last 12 months: 37.7% Last 6-Year Average: 36.6% EBIT Margin Last 12 months: 10.5% Last 6-Year Average: 11.2%

Income Breakdown

2023A

2.035

607

Income Overview

5.484

5,600

■ Revenue ■ Gross Profit ■ FBIT

1,752

2021A

613

4.673

4,983

1,801

2022A

535

FMCG

2020A

1,770

615

4,801

50% of Net sales (L12M).

2019A

1,283

334

MGBP

6,000

5,000

4,000

3.000

2.000

1,000

3,813

- Gross Margins approximately 26.5% (not disclosed)
- Strategy: Drive footfall with A-brands priced 7-15% below traditional retail, enabled by opportunistic sourcing through third-party deals. The low price point builds trust and encourages repeat visits, reinforcing B&M's value-for-money positioning.

General Merchandise

50% of Net sales (L12M).

2024A

- Gross Margins approximately 48% (not disclosed)
- Strategy: Once the FMCG basket is filled, B&M generates most of profits from general merchandise, driven by volume, strong margins, and a broad, rotating assortment that encourages impulse-driven purchases.





Sources: The Company, Tegus, Bloomberg



Market/Industry Overview

Stable Market Outlook Despite Pressured Consumer



Industry Overview

- Industry Structure: The deep discount retail industry in the UK consists of 10 large players, with a total addressable market projected to grow from £44 billion in 2024A to £67 billion by 2035E, (4.3% CAGR).
- Customer Base: Historically centered in rural areas in Northern England, demand is now expanding nationwide, especially as the economic climate deteriorates, driving value-seeking behavior across the UK.
- Cyclicality & Resilience: The discount retail sector has shown strong resilience during economic downturns, often converting first-time shoppers into loyal customers, a trend that persists even during market recoveries.



Customer Pattern Since 2008

2008: The financial crisis prompted a shift in consumer behavior, with 39% of shoppers turning to discount retailers more frequently. Notably, 36% maintained this habit long-term laying the foundation for sustained growth in the discount segment.

2020-2022: The pandemic further accelerated the behavioral shift, with over 20% of consumers permanently moving away from A-brands in favor of cheaper alternatives.

2022-Present: Economic strain in the aftermath of the pandemic has deepened the shift. Today, discount retailers have taken a 16% market share compared to just 4% before 2008.



Current Competition Within the Discount Retail Market Current Store Count B&M

Price range £2-30 (Average selling Product: £13)

FMCG: 50% General merchandise: 50% Gross margin 37.7%

Revenue (L12): 5,600 MGBP

PoundLand

Price range: £1-5, (Average selling Product: £2)

FMCG: 65% General merchandise: 35%

Gross margin 36.4% (approximated)

Revenue (L12)E: 1,900 (1,818 23/24) MGBP


Home Bargains


Price range: £5-15, (Average selling Product: £7)

FMCG: 60% General merchandise: 40%

Gross margin 35.0% (approximated)

Revenue (L12)E: 4.420 (4.209 23/24) MGBP





Sources: KPMG, Statista, Bloomberg Summar

Thesis 1.1 – Growth Strategy



B&M's Actual Growth Strategy

Quotes from CEO prior to 2021

- "The main driver of our growth is the new store opening programme"
- "Our new stores opening programme is the main driver for growth across the Group."
- B&MUK was one of the few retailers **permitted to remain open in 2021**, significantly boosting LFL sales. This resulted in EBIT margins reaching an all-time high.
- **Since 2021**, investor focus has shifted toward like-for-like growth, though it's harder to control, while store expansion still holds strong potential.

The Real Drivers of Revenue Growth – and Their correlation with EBIT Margin



Garden Centers – Key Going Forward


UK Garden Market - Counter-cyclical, with demand rising during downturns


Average spending on Gardens is 34% higher than the European Average

B&M UK is well-placed to capitalize

- 80% of new stores will include a Garden Center.
- Due to this segment's double margin vs.
 FMCG, it acts as a margin of safety as
 B&M absorbs some FMCG inflation to
 protect market share, minimizing gross
 profit dilution.
- B&M's UK current stores are the preferred choice for garden products.

Summary







Sources: Bloomberg, Statista, The Company, Pepco Group, Tegus



Valuation

Thesis 1.2 – Why Continued Store Expansion is Justified



Thrives in Economic Downturns – Wilko Case Study

Wilkos Downfall

Wilko, a competitor specializing in high street and shopping mall retail, faced bankruptcy due to a combination of pandemic-related restrictions, supply chain disruptions, and a shift in consumer behavior toward discount

Execution

- 51 store leases at 55% discount.
- 50% of Wilko customers cross shop at B&M.
- All located in Southern England.
- According to the CEO, high street payback matches the average B&M store.

B&M's Key Strategy in Acquiring Competitors' Closed Stores

<u>customer synergies</u>


Hybrid sourcing and a unique FMCG/GM split boost store turnaround Payback time 13 months, aligned with own store openings

The number of B&M stores per square kilometer decreases significantly toward the south.




Main Competitor Poundland Provides Similar Opportunity

- Poundland, owned by Pepco Group, was sold for 1 pound in May this year. As part of a restructuring by the new owner Gordon Brothers, 100 of their 844 stores are set to close.
- **Poundland** currently presents an opportunity similar to Wilko two years ago. This is expected to accelerate store expansion by 38 stores in the coming three years.



Quote from Pepco Spokesman

"We are actively exploring separation options, including a potential sale, for the Poundland business."



Outlooks for Organic Store Growth in the UK

Quote from B&M Manager

"Post-COVID, Wilkinson's has gone bust and therefore that released a whole tranche of stores into the market. Some of the DIY players like B&Q and Homebase have released some of their portfolio into the market."

HOMEBASE


300 Stores Closed in 2025

2021A

120 Stores Closing in 2025


With major competitors closing most of their stores and many others having negative net openings, the high rate of store closures across the UK presents a strong opportunity for successful discount retailers to expand.

UK Retail Store Closures



Why B&M UK Can Capitalize on the Sector's Massive Store Closures

EBITDA Margins Development



2022A

Home Bargains, the only direct competitor using hybrid sourcing and a similar FMCG/GM model. has been able to sustain store growth and margins.







B&M and Home Bargains remain the only financially strong players in the discount sector, and as competitors reduce their store counts. opportunities for consolidation and expansion emerge

Sources: Bloomberg, The Company, Wilkos, Pepco Group, Tegus, Statista, The Analysts, BBC





2024A

2023A

Thesis 2.1 Valuation Disconnected From Reality







Sources: The Company, Analyst Estimates, Business Wire, Newmark, Financial Times, thebusinessdesk.com



Thesis 2.2 Catalysts for Multiple Re-Rating



France – Underrated Growth Prospects


B&M acquired Babou in 2018–19 and now operates 135 stores in France vs 786 in the UK, despite France having similar population. With no scaled national GM discounter beyond Action, B&M is building early share in a fragmented €25bn+ market, leveraging its UK format into an environment with lower competition intensity.



Catalyst #1 for Re-Rating

France Growth - Underestimated by the market

- Only 2 stores per 1M people vs 11 in the UK France is underpenetrated, with no clear national leader
- Strong unit economics: Revenue/store CAGR of 20.6% (2019–2024); store base growing at 4.4% CAGR
- Margin optionality: FY2022 gross margin in France was 44.4%, vs 36.9% for the Group
- Further growth in France Results group margin expansion, in contrary to sell side estimates



Store Growth & Revenue per Store Growth - Fueling France Growth



Catalyst #2 for Re-Rating


2024A

Market Disconnect

- Reverse DCF implies 3% sales CAGR to 2028E, and margins to decline by 3 percentage points
- Analyst estimate 6% sales CAGR to 2028E and margins to remain flat

Valuation

As performance is set to exceed market expectations the valuation is set to re-rate



Sources: The Company, Analyst Estimates, Business Wire, Newmark

Summary



Valuation and Scenario Analysis



Peer Valuation					
EV/EBITDA	FY25	FY26	FY27	FY28	FY24-28 EBITDA CAGR
Dollarama	28.3x	22.2x	20.3x	18.7x	14.4%
Five Below	9.4x	8.2x	8.0x	7.3x	(5.8%)
Dollar Tree	10.1x	8.9x	8.1x	7.4x	5.5%
Dollar General Corp	9.6x	8.8x	8.3x	7.6x	0.8%
Average	14.4x	11.6x	11.2x	10.3x	3.7%
Median	9.9x	8.9x	8.2x	7.5x	3.2%
B&M Value Retailer	5.6x	5.3x	4.9x	4.6x	4.4%
Discount vs Median	43%	40%	40%	39%	

B&M trades at 30-40% discount against peers – despite above average earnings outlook As multiple is set to re-rate towards peer median – we see a clear path towards > 15 % IRR


DCF Overview					
PV TV	3,475				
Sum PV Forecast	3,381				
EV	6,856				
NIBD	1,137				
Implied Equity	5,719				
NOSH m	10.1				
Implied share price	5.64				
Upside	115.8%				


- The DCF analysis is based on projected FCF over a 10-year period.
- CAPEX is estimated to be around 2% of sales for the forecast period.
- A TGR of 2% is used for the DCF and a WACC of 10,1%.
- The DCF valuation suggests an upside above 100%, indicating that the stock is currently undervalued.

WACC						
5.64	8.1%	9.1%	10.1%	11.1%	12.1%	
38.9%	8.0	6.7	5.8	4.9	4.3	
37.9%	7.9	6.6	5.7	4.8	4.2	
36.9%	7.8	6.5	5.6	4.7	4.1	
35.9%	7.6	6.8	5.5	4.6	3.9	
34.9%	7.5	6.7	5.4	4.4	3.8	

Bull & Bear Case					
Bear Case	FY25	FY26	FY27	FY28	
Sales	5,600	5,880	6,174	6,421	
EBITDA (%)	12%	9%	9%	9%	
EV/EBITDA	5.6x	7.1x	6.8x	6.5x	
Discount vs median	43%	19%	17%	14%	
Bull Case	FY25	FY26	FY27	FY28	
Sales	5,600	6,090	6,666	7,284	
EBITDA (%)	12%	13%	13%	13%	
EV/EBITDA	5.6x	4.8x	4.3x	4.0x	
Discount vs median	43%	46%	48%	47%	

Discount towards peer group ranges from 15% to 48% in a bull and bear case – showcasing attractive R/R





	FY25E	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
P/E	7.3	6.8	6.2	5.8
Earnings yield (%)	13.8%	14.7%	16.0%	17.4%

Average valuation	Зу	5y	7y	10y
P/E	13.0	12.2	14.1	16.8
Earnings yield (%)	7.7%	8.2%	7.1%	6.0%

Sources: The Company, Analyst Estimates, Bloomberg



Thesis

Key Risks & Mitigation


Manageable Risks with Lucrative Opportunities



1. Gross Margins Pressure to Drive LFL Sales

B&M faces the risk of being forced to lower prices to increase Like-for-Like sales as UK consumers currently are under pressure.

- Increased focus on Garden centers: To maintain gross margins in the 36–38% range, the Company is prioritizing new garden center openings in the UK to preserve a balanced 50/50 sales mix between general merchandise and FMCG. If B&M delivers on the target of having 80% of new stores in this format, the margin risk should be significantly reduced.
- As competition decreases in certain areas: B&M's value proposition is further reinforced by offering FMCG at lower price points than traditional retailers, reducing the need for further discounting to drive footfall.



3. Execution Risk in the Appointment of the New CEO

Another weak CEO appointment could irreparably damage trust in the board, undermining long-term returns

New CEO could help restore trust in the company, but if mishandled, risk of exacerbating the situation through prolonged poor communication and weak execution.

- The Arora family and founders remain the largest shareholders, having scaled B&M from a small entrepreneurial venture into a major enterprise
- After just 2.5 years, the board decided to dismiss Alex Russo, a move that should be seen as a sign of strength rather than weakness. A mistake was made, but now, hopefully, being corrected
- However, with operations spanning three segments across two countries and over 1,255 stores, the CEO remains largely removed from day-to-day operations
- After two years of miscommunication, false promises, and deteriorating trust under Russo, it's hard to imagine the situation getting worse, almost any successor is likely to be an improvement

2. Sourcing Risk

B&M's business model currently functions well, but if supply from third-party dealers declines, the Company may be forced to source directly from A-brands significantly increasing COGS.

Expert calls suggest that B&M's sourcing model has limits, long-term growth is constrained, with approximately 2,000 stores seen as the upper bound under the current setup.

- However, as competition eases, demand for remnant stock may decline, allowing B&M to continue operating its business model successfully without significant disruption
- With a current store count of 1255, B&M has room left to support new store openings for at least the next 10 years.



Summary: Risk & Mitigation



Sources: The Company, Tegus

Summary Business Market



Valuation

Risks

Management



Experienced Management with Attractive Incentive Program



CEO Transition

Alex Russo - Outgoing CEO



Years at B&M: 5

Background: CFO 2020-2022, appointed Group CEO 2022. Was ultimately dismissed in the spring of 2025 following performance and communication issues.

Tjeerd Jegen - New CEO



Background: 25 years in the European retail industry, served as CEO for various enterprises such as Hema, Takko Fashion and Woolworths

Incentive Plan for Management

Incentives program based on performance

Performance-Based Rewards: Management's incentives are directly tied to specific, measurable goals that drive the Company's profitability and total shareholder returns.

- Objective Criteria: Targets are grounded in tangible metrics such as EBITDA, earnings per share, total stockholder return, and economic value added, ensuring a results-focused approach.
- Annual financial incentives: 75% of the bonus is based on EBITDA and 25% on individual performance-based targets. CEO: maximum 250% of base salary, CFO: maximum 150% of base salary, Other executives maximum 200% of base salary. 50% of bonuses are converted into shares with a holding period of 3 years.
- Long-term Financial Incentives: Performance-based stock options granted at a value of up to, CEO: 250% of base salary, CFO: 175% of base salary, Other executives: maximum 200% of base salary, 50% based on Total Shareholder return relative to the FTSE 350 retail index, and 50% based on EPS. 3-year performance period followed by 2 year holding period.

Other Key Executives

Mike Schmidt - CFO



Years at B&M: 2.5

Background: 8 years at DFS as an auditor: appointed Group CFO in 2019. Prior to joining DFS, spent 13 years in Investment Banking at CITI and UBS.

Jon Parry - Supply Chain Director



Years at B&M: 3

Background: 15 years of experience at Director level across Retail Supply Chain for Walmart, Asda Stores and Somerfield Stores.

Anthony Giron - MD B&M France



Years at B&M: 5

Background: Previously served as senior executive in retail businesses in France, CEO of Selecta and Hema International.

Tony Dobbs - MD Heron Foods

Years at B&M: 34



Sources: The Company





